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Metaphor, Women and Law 
Adam Arms 
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting out as 
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it. 1 
* 
-Benjamin Cardozo 
Legal discourse is pregnant with metaphor. The legal world has been 
described as a magical one in which "liens float, corporations reside, minds 
hold meetings, and promises run with the land.,,2 Sports, battle and sex 
metaphors dominate discussion of the adversary system.3 Metaphors 
permeate law school lectures.4 Indeed, it would be difficult to have a 
conversation about law without resorting to the use of metaphor. 
Is this use of metaphor in legal speech merely ornamental? Are 
metaphors inherently ambiguous and unnecessary frills, or are they 
essential to understanding the legal worldi' Recent linguistic and 
* B.S., University of California, Davis (1994); M.A., Psychology, Saint Mary's College of 
California (1996); J.D. candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 
class of 1999. I thank Jen Kash, Laura Padilla, Maureen Burke Cobarr, Paula Clarke, Nancy 
Struthers, Ascanio Piomelli and Mu-En Chen, Kelly Lindlar, Sarah Ream, Suzanne 
Robinson, Penelope Shaner and Cary Zuk. A special thanks to Jim Temple. 
1. Berkey v. 3d Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84,94 (1926). 
2. Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REv. 1053 (1989). 
3. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a 
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 51 (1985) ("The conduct of 
litigation is relatively similar (not coincidentally, I suspect) to a sporting event-there are 
rules, a referee, an object to the game, and a winner is declared after the play is over."); 
Thornton v. Breland, 441 So.2d 1348, 1349 (Miss. 1983) (en banc) ("A lawsuit ... is often a 
small war."); United States v. Valdez-Soto, 31 F.3d 1467, 1477 (9th Cir. 1994) (Zilly, 
District J., dissenting) (broad reading of Rule 803(24) would "emasculate" the hearsay 
rule). 
4. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 8 (1991) ("If you were to tape your own classes, would you hear yourself 
speaking in war and sports metaphors?"). See also Eileen A. Scallen, The Big Game: 
Metaphor and Education in the Simpson Trial, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 289 (1995). 
5. See Andrew Ortony, Metaphor, Language and Thought, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 
2-3 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) (providing a general discussion of two theories of 
metaphor-"constructivist theory" which sees metaphor as essential to human 
understanding, and "nonconstructivist theory" which views metaphor as mere rhetoric and 
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psychological research suggests that metaphor, far from being merely 
colorful language, is constitutive of understanding.6 Metaphors appear in 
"everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action.,,7 Some 
researchers have demonstrated that at the very core of our ability to 
understand and act within the world around us lies a metaphorical 
conceptual system.8 In short, metaphor matters. 
This Note examines metaphor's power to construct reality and 
determine action. Part I explores the metaphorical nature of conceptual 
systems and surveys the use of metaphors in legal discourse. Part I also 
considers how a number of metaphors, many of which currently dominate 
legal speech, have played a role in the silencing and subordination of 
women. Part II outlines possible remedies. This section also includes 
suggestions for manipulating metaphor and a brief discussion of alternative 
metaphors. 
I. LEGAL METAPHOR AND THE SILENCING AND 
SUBORDINATION OF WOMEN 
A. THE METAPHORICAL NATURE OF THOUGHT 
That which dominates our imagination and our daily thoughts will 
determine our life and character. Therefore it behooves us to be 
careful what we are worshiping, for what we are worshiping we 
are becoming.9 
Metaphor is commonly defined as "a figure of speech containing an 
implied comparison, in which a word or fhrase ordinarily and primarily 
used of one thing is applied to another." 1 However, this bare definition 
overlooks the everyday importance and predominance of metaphor. 
Linguistic and psychological research indicates that metaphor wields 
enormous power over thought and behavior.ll In fact, some researchers 
thus inessential to understanding). 
6. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 3 (1980); George 
Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 202-03 
(Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993); David E. Leary, Psyche's Muse: The Role of Metaphor 
in the History of Psychology, in METAPHORS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 1 (David E. 
Leary ed., 1990). 
7. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 3. 
8. See id. ("We have found ... that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in 
language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we 
both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature."). See generally GEORGE 
LAKOFF, WOMEN FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE 
MIND (1987). 
9. Rabbi Harold L. Kudan, quoted in David Schuman, Beyond the Waste Land: Law 
Practice in the 1990s, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1,5 (1990). 
10. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 852 (3d College ed. 1988). 
11. See supra notes 5 & 6. 
r4%Ai*f 9 iii 
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assert that all knowledge is metaphorical in nature, and that metaphor is 
thus indispensable for human imagination and reason. 12 
George Lakoff, professor of linguistics at U.C. Berkeley, and Mark 
Johnson, professor of philosophy at University of Oregon, co-authors of 
Metaphors We Live By, investigate and outline metaphor's relationship to 
thought and action. Utilizing the conceptual metaphor 'argument is war,' 
Lakoff and Johnson give an example of a metaphorical concept and how it 
structures activity.13 Employing everyday expressions, Lakoff and Johnson 
show how this metaphor is embedded in our culture: "Your claims are 
indefensible. He attacked every weak point in my argument. His criticisms 
were right on target . ... If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out. He 
shot down all of my arguments.,,14 Lakoff and Johnson explain that these 
are not just figures of speech but evidence of an underlying metaphor-
'argument is war' -which molds the way we view arguments, thus shaping 
the way we perform while arguing. IS Accordingly, the person with whom 
one is arguing is seen as an opponent, someone to attack and overpower. 
The range of acceptable outcomes may also be limited by this 
metaphor. For example, accepting the 'argument as war' metaphor may 
predispose one to only experiencing satisfaction with winning, as opposed 
to feeling gratification when compromises are reached. In contrast to a 
war, an argument can result in two winners. Arguments can be informative 
and enlightening for all parties involved, and mutual respect may be 
gained. However, if one views an argument as a winllose situation-
likened to a war or a sporting event, for example-one will not likely aim 
for nor appreciate an argument's other valuable products. 
While metaphor aids in the conception of abstract concepts, such 
understanding is necessarily limited. The comparison which allows us to 
understand "one aspect of a concept in terms of another (e.g., 
comprehending an aspect of arguin* in terms of a battle) will necessarily 
hide other aspects of the concept."l For example, while the 'argument is 
12. See Leary, supra note 6, at 2 ("All knowledge is ultimately rooted in metaphorical (or 
analogical) modes of perception and thought."); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TuRNER, MORE 
THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR xi (1989) ("Far from being 
merely a matter of words, metaphor is a matter of thought-all kinds of thought: thought 
about emotion, about society, about human character, about language, and about the nature 
of life and death. It is indispensable not only to our imagination but also to our reason."). 
13. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 4. 
14. [d. (emphasis in original). 
15. [d. 
Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept 
of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the 
structure of an argument-attack, defense, counterattack, etc.-reflects this. 
It is in this sense that the argument is war metaphor is one that we live by in 
this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing. 
[d. (emphasis in original). 
16. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 10. 
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war' metaphor fastens on and highlights the combative aspects of a dispute, 
other aspects of arguing inconsistent with the metaphor are hidden. 
Cooperative aspects, such as the fact that arguments are an effort at mutual 
understanding, as noted above, are often overlooked. 17 Awareness of this 
highlightinglhiding effect becomes especially important when dealing with 
legal metaphors. As discussed below;8 what legal metaphors hide may 
lead to oppression and marginalization.19 
Not all researchers view metaphor as a powerful influence. Some, such 
as Earl R. Mac Cormac, are willing to concede that metaphor may play an 
initial role in understanding but then loses its influence with time and use.20 
This view sees the oft-used metaphor's power as eventually dying and the 
metaphor "becoming part of a mundane conventional language, the 
cemetery of creative thought. ,,21 From this perspective, embedded, 
conventional metaphors play little if any role in the conception of abstract 
domains.22 
However, conventional metaphors-unconsciously used elements of 
everyday language-are far from dead.23 George Lakoff and Mark Turner 
assert that "[t]he things most alive in our conceptual system are those 
things that we use constantly, unconsciously and automatically.,,24 The 
omnipresence of, and systematic coherence between, various metaphoric 
expressions evidences the unconscious power and life of these so-called 
dead metaphors.25 
Social science researchers Nandini Nyack and Raymond Gibbs have 
explored the significance of conventionalized metaphor?6 In one study, 
subjects given a story describing a woman's anger at another gentleman in 
terms of heat in a pressurized container gave higher appropriateness ratings 
to the oft-used metaphorical phrase "she blew her top," than to another 
commonly used phrase, "she bit his head Off."27 In another situation, 
subjects gave higher appropriateness ratings to the term "she bit his head 
17. See id. 
18. See infra section Ie. 
19. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON supra note 6, at 236. Lakoff and Johnson discuss the 
potential dangers of "political and economic metaphors," but the same reasoning may be 
applied to legal metaphors: "[I]n the area of politics and economics, metaphors matter more, 
because they constrain our lives. A metaphor in a political or economic system, by virtue of 
what it hides, can lead to human degradation." Id. 
20. See EARL R. MAC CORMAC, A COGNITIVE THEORY OF METAPHOR 6 (1985). 
21. George Lakoff, The Death of Dead Metaphor, 2 METAPHOR & SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY 
143 (1987). 
22. See generally MAC CORMAC, supra note 20. 
23. See LAKOFF & TuRNER, supra note 12, at xi. 
24. Id. at 62. 
25. This is seen in the 'argument is war' examples discussed previously. See LAKOFF & 
JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 4. 
26. See Nandini P. Nayak & Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Conceptual Knowledge in the 
Interpretation of Idioms, 1191. EXPERlMENTALPSYCHOL.: GENERAL 315 (1990). 
27. Id. at 326--27. 
tfMrii*tAUi 
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off' where the woman's anger was described in terms of a ferocious 
animal. Nyack and Gibbs believe these subjects picked up on connections 
existing between metaphorical phrases and evidence in the descriptions of 
anger. 28 For example, they suggest that the general knowledge people have 
of heat in a pressurized container is mapped onto their knowledge of 
anger.29 They see these metaphors, and metaphor in general, as constitutive 
of meaning and influential on action rather than merely a decorative figure 
of speech.30 
Other telling research has demonstrated the necessity of metaphor in 
accessing and conceptualizing abstract subjects. One example is a study by 
Dedre and Donald Gentner examining students' understanding of 
electricity.31 They found that students understood electricity 
metaphorically in one of two ways: as a fluid or as a crowd of individual 
entities.32 The behavior of electricity is such that it is correctly predicted in 
some situations when it is seen as having the properties of a liquid,33 while 
in other situations electricity's behavior is only correctly predicted if 
viewed as a crowd of individual entities. 34 This study supports the 
proposition that a meaningful understanding of electricity requires the use 
of metaphor and, as was shown here, entails the ability to conceptualize 
and use multiple metaphors. 
Thomas Kuhn, in his landmark work, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, writes about the need for metaphorical models in science.35 
These models, according to Kuhn, 
supply [scientists] with preferred or permissible analogies and 
metaphors. By doing so they help to determine what will be 
accepted as an explanation and as a puzzle-solution; conversely, 
they assist in the determination of the roster of unsolved puzzles 
and in the evaluation of the importance of each.36 
Metaphor has permeated all realms of science, including the natural 
sciences.37 Both Carl Linnaeus, arguably history's most influential 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. Dedre Gentner & Donald R. Gentner, Flowing Waters or Teeming Crowds: Mental 
Models of Electricity, in MENTAL MODELS 99 (Dedre Gentner & Albert L. Stevens eds., 
1983). 
32. See id. at 107-11 (discussing the two analogies used). 
33. See id. at 115-16 (situations involving electricity and batteries). 
34. See id. (situations involving electricity and parallel resistors). 
35. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-45 (1970). 
36. [d. at 184. 
37. See LONDA SCHlEBINGER, NATURE'S BODY: GENDER IN THE MAKING OF MODERN 
SCIENCE (1993). Paralleling Kuhn's view, supra text accompanying notes 35-36, 
Schiebinger notes, "[M]etaphors and analogies are themselves constitutive elements of 
science. The prominent eighteenth-century notion, for example, that nature was a machine 
gave direction to research, suggested interpretive frameworks, and, in many cases, dictated 
E. 
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taxonomist, and Charles Darwin used hypersexual metaphors to describe 
plant life.38 Professor Londa Schiebinger notes how "Linnaeus' s system 
[for describing plant reproduction] focused as much on the 'nuptuals' of 
living plants as on their sexuality. Before their lawful marriage, trees and 
shrubs donned 'wedding gowns.' Flower petals spread as 'bridal beds for a 
verdant groom and his cherished bride .... ,,39 Such conspicuous use of 
metaphor, not to mention unobtrusive usage, continues to pervade 
. 40 SCIence. 
In sum, we rely upon metaphor constantly and unconsciously in our 
daily lives. Metaphor wields an incredible amount of power over us-it 
determines not only our understanding of abstract phenomena, but of 
everyday occurrences and commonplace things. However, metaphor hides 
certain aspects of the very domains it helps us to understand. Moreover, 
unconscious usage means uncritical usage; we do not question metaphor's 
validity, and when used by another person, we tend to accept a 
conventionalized metaphor's legitimacy without a critical thought.41 
B. METAPHOR IN LEGAL DISCOURSE 
Metaphor plays an important role in many fields. As previously 
discussed, the social sciences42 and the physical sciences43 rely heavily on 
metaphor. Metaphor shapes the questions to be asked, determines the 
routes to finding solutions and defines what will be accepted as reasonable 
answers.44 Metaphor has the same impact in the legal world. 
Elizabeth Thornburg, professor at Southern Methodist University 
School of Law, researched the use of metaphor in the legal context. She 
ascertained that "[m]etaphors so pervade our language about litigation that 
it is almost impossible to talk about a trial without using metaphors.,,45 She 
found that battle, sports and sex metaphors dominate discourse within the 
American adversary system.46 
Thornburg's extensive research uncovers numerous instances of the use 
what counted as proof or explanation." Id. at 24 (citations omitted). Shiebinger's book 
provides an intriguing look at notions of sexuality and gender in the history of the natural 
sciences. 
38. See id. 
39. Id. at 23. Schiebinger also discusses how Linnaeus' sexual metaphors involved the 
marriage customs of the time period. She notes that the two types of plant marriage 
Linnaeus contemplated, "public" and "clandestine," corresponded to the European customs 
of his time. 
40. See id. at 27. 
41. See LAKOFF & TuRNER, supra note 12, at 63. 
42. See generally Ortony, supra note 5. 
43. See KUHN, supra note 35, at 184. 
44. See id. 
45. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How 111Ulges of Battle, Sports, and Sex 
Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 225, 231 (1995). 
46. See id. at 231-32. 
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of war metaphors to describe the process of litigation.47 "Parties arm 
themselves, draw battle lines, offer or refuse quarter, plan preemptive 
strikes, joust, cross swords, undertake frontal assaults... seek total 
annihilation of their enemies, marshal forces, attack ... .',48 The location 
of the trial is also often described by way of battle metaphors.49 "Trials can 
take place in trenches, staging areas, and battlefields.',50 Litigation 
strategy, as well, is described with war metaphors. "Litigants may use 
Rambo tactics, Pearl Harbor tactics, scorched earth tactics, kamikaze 
tactics ... and Hiroshima tactics.,,51 
Thornburg documents the use of sports and game metaphors describing 
litigation. Trial lawyers are seen "as game players, boxers, team members, 
or forensic athletes. Judges, not surprisingly, are seen as referees or 
umpires.,,52 Lawsuits are compared to "blind man's bluff, hide and seek, 
chess, a game of chance. .. a cat and mouse game, a poker game, a 
football game, a boxing match ... a race, hunting, Monopoly, and even a 
confidence game. ,,53 
Law students' initiation into the world of law includes being introduced 
to its metaphors. Law professors, consciously or unconsciusly, work with 
and within conventional metaphor. Paul Bergman, professor of law at the 
University of California, Los Angeles, in a trial advocacy treatise aimed at 
students, posits that some litigators see trial as "always something of a 
crapshoot. ,,54 Continuing in the sports metaphor vein, in a section 
describing how factfinders use evidence to construct stories, Bergman 
offers a diagram of the factfinder's task "based on an off-tackle play 
developed by the 1938 Chicago Bears ... .',55 Professor Eileen Scallen 
states, after noting the power and omnipresence of the 'trial as sport' 
metaphor, "I teach the game; I teach how to play it effectively.',56 For 
Scallen, the 'trial as sport' metaphor has its downsides, such as 
emphasizing winning and losing-which leads Scallen to try to focus 
students' attention on how the game should be played. 57 Professor Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow notes that law professors constantly use war and sports 
h . I 58 metap ors III ectures. 
The use of the baseball metaphor in legal discourse and theory has 
become a source of lively scholarly debate. The legal world's embracing 
47. See id. at 235. 
48. [d. (footnotes omitted). 
49. See id. 
50. /d. (footnotes omitted). 
51. [d. at 236 (footnotes omitted). 
52. [d. at 237 (footnotes omitted). 
53. [d. at 238 (footnotes omitted). 
54. PAUL BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY 4 (3d ed. 1997). 
55. /dat 17. 
56. Scallen, supra note 4, at 292. 
57. [d. 
58. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 8-9. 
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of the baseball metaphor has been criticized by some,59 heralded by 
others.6o However, there is agreement that America's obsession with 
baseball is reflected in America's legal discourse.61 
Sexual metaphor also pervades legal language. Courts speak of 
"emasculating" the following: the rule against hearsay,62 the right to cross-
examination63 and "summary judgment as an efficient procedural device.,,64 
Courts also use impotence to describe ineffectiveness.65 Although 
Elizabeth Thornburg's research suggests that sexual metaphors tend to be 
used more covertly, she posits that sexual imagery in the legal world is 
often tied to war and sports metaphors' imagery of domination and 
. 66 
aggresSIOn. 
Law professor Thomas Ross also writes of metaphor in the legal world, 
examining the contradictions legal metaphors pose and the paradoxes they 
create.67 Ross suggests that "[l]egal metaphors are indispensable pieces of 
the legal culture, not merely tolerated, but needed.,,68 Metaphor, suggests 
Ross, is crucial to understanding and allows us to construct our realities-
including legal reality. 69 He describes some conventional legal 
metaphors-property metaphors of "bundles" and "lists,,,7o constitutional 
metaphors of "walls" and "lenses,,,71 and the "poisonous tree" metaphor 
used in criminal procedure to describe excluded evidence.72 Ross examines 
the power of each to shape our understanding of the particular areas of law 
in which they have found a foothold.73 
Our understanding of the First Amendment has been influenced by the 
"marketplace" metaphor.74 Chad Oldfather suggests that Justice White 
59. See Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball 
Metaphors in Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REv. 17 (1994). 
60. See Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, (S)he Will Come: Judicial Opinions, 
Metaphors, Baseball, and "The Sex Stuff," 28 CONN. L. REv. 813 (1996). 
61. See id. at 824. 
62. See U.S. v. Valdez-Soto, 31 F.3d 1467, 1477 (9th Cir. 1994). 
63. See Miller v. U.S., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 17162 (6th Cir. 1994). 
64. Vana v. Mallinckrodt Med., Inc., 849 F. Supp. 576, 578 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
65. See Thornburg, supra note 45 at 241 ("For example, one court rejected an 
interpretation of a rule of evidence because it would 'render Rule 703 impotent as a tool for 
testing the trustworthiness of the facts and data underlying the expert's opinion. "') (footnote 
omitted). 
66. See id. at 240. 
67. See Ross, supra note 2. 
68. Id. at 1076-77 ("Put simply: metaphors are essentially paradoxical pieces of 
language; law is essentially paradoxical; thus, legal metaphors are a perfectly sensible way 
of talking about law."). 
69. See id. at 1053. For a discussion of metaphor and the construction of legal reality, 
see MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY (1985). 
70. Ross, supra note 2, at 1055-63. 
71. Id. at 1063-67. 
72. /d. at 1067-75. 
73. Seeid at 1053-75. 
74. Oldfather, supra note 59, at 26-27. 
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"placed the metaphor at the core of First Amendment jurisprudence,,75 
when he declared in a 1969 decision that "it is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth 
will ultimately prevail .... ,,76 This metaphor is alive and well today, and 
continues to form the background against which courts view First 
Amendment issues.77 
There are far too many conventional legal metaphors to address here, 
but doing so is not the purpose of this section; my aim is to show that law 
needs metaphor. Metaphor structures the way we talk about the legal 
actors and events and, more importantly, it consciously and unconsciously 
structures the way we conceive of the legal world. It is the very nature of 
law which makes legal metaphor matter. Life, liberty, property, dignity, 
family and community are all affected by legal decisions which in turn are 
formulated in part by, and understood through, legal metaphor. 
Acknowledging the need for legal metaphor, it is of utmost importance 
to turn a critical eye toward them and to evaluate their effects. What do 
legal metaphors hide? What do they highlight? Does their shaping of our 
understanding of the law marginalize or subordinate certain populations or 
communities? If so, are 'fairer' alternative metaphors available which 
would tend to empower these populations? 
C. LEGAL METAPHOR AND WOMEN'S SILENCING AND SUBORDINATION 
As noted above, metaphor is omnipresent in legal discourse, and 
certain metaphors tend to dominate in specific areas of law-for example, 
the aforementioned prevalence of sports, war and sex metaphors in 
litigation language. Different effects flow from the use of one particular 
metaphor over another. 78 I suggest that the effects of some conventional 
legal metaphors have detrimentally impacted women in a variety of ways. 
This section will examine two areas where such metaphors have 
contributed to women's silencing and subordination: first, women have 
been disproportionately denied certain property rights via reliance on the 
conventional property law 'bundle of sticks' and 'grasped thing' 
metaphors; and second, the exclusion of women and women's voices from 
law's discourse caused by uncritical use of the gender-linked sports, war 
and sex metaphors omnipresent in legal language. 
Thomas Kuhn proposes that science uses metaphors to determine what 
problems exist to be solved, what rules will be followed in solving them 
and what solutions will be acceptable.79 Similarly, legal scholar Lucinda 
75. Id. at 26. 
76. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
77. See Oldfather, supra note 59, at 26-29. See also HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND 
REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1992). 
78. See supra section IA. 
79. See KUHN, supra note 35, at 184. 
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Finley posits that "[l]egallanguage frames the issues, it defines the terms in 
which speech in the legal world must occur, it tells us how we should 
understand a problem and which explanations are acceptable and which are 
not.,,80 Using conventional legal metaphor to define law's questions, 
problem-solving processes and solutions has consequences--consequences 
that may be more dangerous and far-reaching than apparent at first glance. 
(i) Property Metaphors 
Property, as a concept, is abstract. After all, what is property? Is it to 
"have a thing in our hands, to keep it, to make it, to sell it, to work it up 
into something else ... ?,,81 Or is property solely a human construction, 
merely a function of law?82 Perhaps property is simply a definable relation 
between individuals.83 One has described the idea of property such that 
"[t]here is no image, no painting, no visible trait, which can express the 
relation that constitutes property. It is not material, it is metaphysical; it is 
a mere conception of the mind.,,84 One thing is clear-metaphor has been 
used throughout history to define property. 
Two traditional property meta~hors will next be discussed: the 'bundle 
of sticks,' and the 'grasped thing.' 5 Both of these metaphors have become 
embedded in the common legal conception of, and discourse surrounding, 
personal property86 -and both metaphors have played a part in the 
subordination of women. 
Thomas Ross acknowledges that metaphor functions as a builder of 
legal realities, not simply a figure of speech. 87 Metaphors, he contends, 
"shatter and reconstruct our realities. And in ways we cannot say.,,88 
Ross's concern is that the metaphors the legal world so desperately needs 
also serve to hide important realities.89 He acknowledges that decisions in 
the legal world often have very powerful, sometimes violent, 
consequences-the danger we risk by uncritically using metaphors is the 
risk of becoming sheltered from this reality. 90 
80. Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the 
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886,905 (1989). 
81. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGIS LA nON 112 (4th ed. 1882). 
82. See id. at 113 ("Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws 
were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases."). 
83. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357 
(1954). 
84. BENTHAM, supra note 81. 
85. These are not the only metaphors of property law, but they are arguably the most 
widely used. 
86. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the 
Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REv. 239 (1994). 
87. See Ross, supra note 2. 
88. [d. at 1076. 
89. See id. at 1084. 
90. See id. 
Our choices are hard; the consequences are cruel. . .. We can hide from all 
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Ross explores the significance of the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor 
embraced by property law.91 He traces the history of this metaphor, finding 
its genesis in the New Deal.92 Ross postulates that the early natural law 
concept of private property was that of "thing ownership," but increasing 
governmental regulation of property use to redistribute wealth rendered this 
conception unworkable.93 Notions of private property became more 
complex "[s]o, we adopted a metaphor. Property, we came to understand, 
is a 'bundle of sticks. ",94 The various legally recognized rights incident to 
ownership of some tangible or intangible thing compose the "sticks" of the 
"bundle. ,,95 
Ross next critiques metaphor. He notes that this metaphor, like any 
other, cannot capture the complete essence of the equivocal subject of 
"private property.,,96 Property is not simply an aggregation of legally 
recognized rights, it can be "a fundamental idea, a source of autonomy, an 
instrument of oppression, and so on. ,,97 
Scholars have also criticized the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor because of 
its penchant to carry a sense of uniformity to various forms of property. 98 
Each "interest stick" within the bundle is seen as identical99 and the 
metaphor assumes a sense of sameness as one moves from object to 
object.1oo This has its consequences. For example, Ross believes the 
metaphor ignores the very real distinctions in feelings he has for things he 
owns; he notes that under the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor, "[t]he bundle 
that is my computer is the same as the bundle that is my wedding ring.,,101 
This parallels Margaret Jane Radin's belief that a very real difference exists 
this in the shelter of our metaphors. We can make believe this is not so .... 
But by what right do we take for ourselves this shelter when we impose on 
another human being the power and violence that is law? 
[d. (footnote omitted). 
91. See id. at 1055-63. For another interesting look at the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor, 
see Stephen 1. Safranek, Can Science Guide Legal Argumentation? The Role of Metaphor 
in Constitutional Cases, 25 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 357 (1994). 
92. See Ross, supra note 2, at 1056. 
93. [d. at 1055-56. 
94. [d. at 1056. 
95. See id. "The 'bundle' is a metaphorical characterization of the aggregate of legally 
recognized rights of an individual in some particular thing. My rights to sell, lease, give, 
and possess my house are the sticks which together constitute the bundle." [d. 
96. [d. at 1058. 
97. [d. 
98. See id. at 1062. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood 34 STAN. L. 
REv. 957 (1982). In addition to its critics, the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor has its supporters. 
See, e.g., Safranek, supra note 91, at 401 (offering that the metaphor has been useful, 
"serv[ing] as a guide to the Supreme Court, lower courts, and the public."). 
99. Ross, supra note 2, at 1062. "Each interest after all is a stick. Thus, my right to lease 
my home may seem the analytical equivalent of my right to physically possess it." /d. 
100. See id. 
101. [d. (footnote ommitted). 
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between fungible property, "property that is held purely instrumentally,,,102 
and personal property, which Radin defines as "property that is bound up 
with a person.,,103 Radin theorizes that certain items of personal property 
may become so bound up with one's sense of self that they should not be 
considered traditional "property" at all. 104 Her position can be said to 
advocate for refocusing the view of property in order to take individuals' 
feelings and meanings into account. 
Property law's 'bundle of sticks' metaphor has had effects more 
insidious than denying feelings of connection to property. For example, the 
uncritical acceptance of this metaphor has played a part in structures, 
procedures and traditions that have traditionally subordinated and 
marginalized women. The history of family law offers illustrations-
specifically in cases where women, upon marriage dissolution, were denied 
shares of married couples' human capital due to courts' reliance on the 
'bundle of sticks' (often in combination with the 'grasped thing') metaphor. 
As a result, divorced single women have historically been thrust into 
. . b 105 poverty In massIve num ers. 
Legal scholar Joan Williams examines this connection between poverty 
and gender. 106 She notes that "[sJixty percent of all people in poverty and 
two-thirds of the elderly poor are women.,,107 A woman's standard of 
living declines by an average of 73 percent in the year following divorce, 
while men, on the average, experience a 42 percent rise. 108 The average 
income for female-headed families is less than half that of male-headed 
families, and "families composed of women and children are ten times 
more likely to stay poor than are families where a male is present."I09 This 
impoverishment, argues Williams, is primarily due to the unfair system of 
property allocation upon divorce. llo Historically, a husband's wage has not 
been characterized as property subject to apportionment and hence 
divorced women and their children have been disproportionately 
impoverished. lll She posits that, although today's laws may be aimed at 
providing women with an equal right to own property, "the legal definition 
of property excludes human capital, leaving women with disproportionately 
102. Radin, supra note 98, at 960. 
103. Id. at 960. 
104. Id. at 959. 
105. See Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989); R. EISLER, 
DISSOLUTION: No-FAULT DIVORCE, MARRIAGE, AND THE FuTURE OF WOMEN 20-54 (1977). 
106. See Joan Williams, Married Women's Property, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 383 
(1994). 
107. /d. (footnotes omitted). 
108. Williams, supra note 105, at 826, citing LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE 
REVOLUTION 337-56 (1985). 
109. Williams, supra note 105, at 826--27 (footnote omitted). 
110. See Williams, supra note 106, at 384. 
111. See id. 
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little property to own .... ,,112 
Williams suggests that judges, being overwhelmingly male and 
successful in a profession which requires huge investments in human 
capital, directly benefit from a definition of property that does not include 
human capital. l13 It is much more to their advantage, should their 
marriages dissolve, for their law degrees and prestigious positions to not be 
defined as property. Otherwise, both could be portioned out to an ex-
spouse. Arguably, this may unconsciously effect male judges' motivations, 
possibly pushing them to rely on one metaphor over another when deciding 
how to frame human capital in divorce proceedings. Some judges may feel 
compelled to stick to the boundaries of conventional, traditionally male-
benefiting, metaphors when defining human capital. 
In Re Marriage of Graham, a Colorado Supreme Court case, 
confronted the issue of whether a husband's human capital in the form of a 
master's degree in business administration (M.B.A.) constituted a property 
right which the wife jointly owned, rendering it subject to division by the 
court upon dissolution of the marriage. 114 During their marriage, the 
husband was primarily a student, earning his B.S. and M.B.A., while the 
wife worked full-time and contributed seventy percent of the couple's 
financial earnings.115 The wife also did most of the housework and meal 
preparation for the couple.116 No children were born and no marital assets 
were accumulated. 117 
In dissolution proceedings, the trial court found that "an education 
obtained by one spouse during the marriage is jointly-owned property to 
which the other spouse has a property right.,,118 The court of appeals 
reversed, "holding that an education is not itself 'property' subject to 
division .... ,,119 The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the court of 
appeals, basing its decision on the following reasoning: 
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not 
encompassed even by the broad views of the concept of 'property.' 
It does not have an exchange value or any other objective 
transferable value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. 
It terminates on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot 
be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced 
degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous 
education, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be 
112. [d. at 407-08. 
113. See id. at 401. 
114. In Re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978). 
115. See id. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. 
118. [d. at 76 
119. [d. 
6& ;, ; 
€i_ & 
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acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an 
intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future 
acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that term. 120 
Looking closely, it is clear that the court relied on a particular 
metaphor to deny the ex-wife a valuable property right. The definition of 
human capital is at issue, and the court decided to use the 'bundle of sticks' 
metaphor as its frame of reference. An M.B.A., according to the court, 
lacks some of the essential attributes of property. 121 The court labeled 
some of these characteristics: exchange value, transferable value on the 
open market, assignability, conveyability and inheritability.122 Here, the 
court defined some of the separate 'sticks' which comprise property's 
bundle of sticks and concluded that because an M.B .A. lacks certain sticks 
it is not property. The court's strict adherence to the 'bundle of sticks' 
metaphor in this case disallowed a conception of property which could 
include human capital. 
The 'bundle of sticks' metaphor is relatively young in legal terms, and 
is predated by other property metaphors, such as property as a 'grasped 
thing.,123 While the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor focuses on legally -defined 
rights between persons, earlier definitions of property involved conceptions 
of a person having physical control over some external thing. 124 
Accordingly, property historians comment on the development of the 
concept of property in 'grasping' or 'grabbing' terms. 125 One such 
historian states, "In fact, the 'own' which the laws of property protect is 
whatever an individual has managed to get hold of, and equality of right, 
applied to property, means only that every man has an equal right to 
b ,,126 gra . 
The grasping metaphor focuses on the tangible. Property as a 'grasped 
thing' necessarily involves an actor (the grasper), an act (grasping) and an 
object being grasped (a res or 'thing,).127 A mental image is formed of a 
120. [d. at 77. Cf O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576 (1985) (holding a medical license 
earned during marriage was marital property subject to equitable distribution). 
121. See Graham, 574 P.2d at 77. 
122. See id. 
123. See generally Schroeder, supra note 86. 
124. See id. 
125. See RICHARD SCHLATIER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1951). 
126. [d. at 130-31 ("The institution of property was an agreement among men legalizing 
what each had already grabbed, without any right to do so, and granting, for the future, a 
formal right of ownership to the first grabber. "). 
127. The idea that early personal property definitions were solely "physicalist 
conceptions," that is, involving only external physical objects, has been contested: J. 
Vandevelde argued that they were, and that Blackstone was the chief backer of this view. J. 
Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modem 
Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1980). However, Jeanne L. Schroeder contests 
this idea: "Moreover, Blackstone not only is aware but absolutely insists that 'things,' as so 
amze=:~ "6 
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hand gripping a physical object. Use of this metaphor to conceive of 
personal property, and utilization of the image it invokes, necessarily limits 
one's understanding of property to that which is consistent with the 
metaphor. Knowing this, we must question what the metaphor hides from 
us. We must uncover the consequences of using this particular metaphor. 
First, the metaphor renders it difficult to conceive of personal property 
that is intangible. It is difficult to conceive of grasping something that has 
no corporeal presence. Second, the metaphor focuses on the relationship 
between the actor and the res, while pushing aside aspects of the idea of 
rights between individuals. Any sense of property's place in the 
community is suppressed by the metaphor. The idea that owning property 
involves a number of legal rights, some of which can be taken away or 
altered by the state, is hidden. 
Perhaps to a greater extent than the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor, the 
property as a 'grasped thing' metaphor has contributed to women's 
subordination. For example, the grasping metaphor has been used in 
combination with the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor in family law, again, to 
prevent women from sharing in a couple's human capital upon dissolution 
of marriage. 
Todd v. Todd, a California case, presents a similar issue to the one seen 
in Graham above. 128 A husband earned an L.L.B. during a seventeen-year 
marriage and was admitted to the California State Bar.129 The wife worked 
during the entire marriage, using her income to help her husband through 
law school. 130 Upon dissolution of the marriage, the wife claimed the 
husband's law degree was valuable community property subject to 
division. 131 The court held that the husband's degree was possibly a 
property right, but was clearly not subject to division, stating: 
At best, education is an intangible property right, the value of 
which, because of its character, cannot have a monetary value 
placed upon it for division between spouses. 
Plaintiff has cited no case law holding that the education of a 
spouse acquired in whole or in part with community moneys is 
tangible property, the value of which may be divided with the other 
spouse. 132 
Here the court is using the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor and the 'grasped 
thing' metaphor to reinforce each other. 133 The court suggests that because 
defined, are not limited to the corporeal and the tangible." Schroeder, supra note 86, at 280. 
128. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786 (1969). 
129. See id. 
130. See id. at 790. 
131. See id. 
132. [d. at 791 (emphasis added). 
133. Jeanne L. Schroeder contends that the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor is simply an 
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one crucial stick-amenability to monetary value-attachment-is missing 
from the bundle of sticks, the educational degree is not tangible nor 
graspable property and thus is not 'true' property. Reliance on the two 
metaphors allows a narrow view of property that devalues intangible 
property and intangible property rights; property that doesn't have the right 
sticks in its bundle can not be grasped and is thus not property. The 
Graham134 and Todd135 cases are but two cases of many where women have 
been denied their fair share of a couple's human capital-a valuable 
property right-upon divorce. One wonders about the number of divorced 
women, some jobless, some with children, who thus suddenly found 
themselves with a paucity of resources to eke out a living. Much of this 
seems due to courts' reliance on conventional metaphors incompatible with 
a perspective of property that would include human capital. 
Property metaphors' oppressive capacity is seen again when examining 
the rationale historically used to explain away married women's property 
rights. Mid-Nineteenth century common law held that a woman and a man 
became one legal person upon marriage,136 and that one person was the 
husband. I37 Essentially, during marriage the husband "had nearly absolute 
authority over [his wife's] person and property .... ,,138 The husband 
"became the owner, outright, of all her personal property" and he "owned 
all the economic value of any property that a woman might bring to or 
acquire during marriage-stocks and bonds, bank accounts, houses, farms, 
carriages, cattle and even wages.,,139 A woman herself became property-
her husband's property-during marriage. I40 
The property as a 'grasped thing' metaphor played a stabilizing role in 
the perpetuation of this oppressive scheme. The metaphor has, at its 
foundation, a subject and an object; the subject is the actor physically 
grasping the object; historically, married women have been viewed as 
extension of the property as a 'grasped thing' metaphor. She posits that the 'bundle of 
sticks' metaphor is "a metaphor of the sensuous, possessory, and tangible. Sticks and 
bundles are physical things that one can, and stereotypically does, see and sensuously grasp 
in one's hand." Schroeder, supra note 86, at 242-43. 
134. 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978). 
135. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786 (1969). 
136. See Diane Avery & Alfred S. Konefsky, The Daughters of Job: Property Rights and 
Women's Lives in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts, 10 LAW & RIST. REv. 323, 326 
(1992). 
137. See id. 
138. [d. 
139. [d. 
140. See LORENNE M.G. CLARK & DEBRA J. LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE 
SEXUALITY 112-17 (1977). Clark and Lewis discuss how women have been traditionally 
seen as "objects rather than the subjects of property rights: women were among the forms of 
private property owned and controlled by individual men." [d. They also note that "[u]nder 
Anglo-Saxon law, rape ... was punished by orders to pay compensation and reparation. If a 
woman was raped, a sum was paid to either her husband or father, depending on who still 
exercised rights of ownership over her .... " [d. 
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objects. Women have been the things grasped and not the graspers. How 
can an object reach out and hold something? It conflicts with an object's 
nature. However, men have always been subjects, and men have been the 
actors in this metaphorical scheme which contemplates aggressive hands 
grasping property. Acceptance of the 'grasped thing' metaphor made more 
incomprehensible the concept of women grasping, and thus their owning 
of, property and helped keep women bereft of property's power. 
Despite their shortcomings and the availability of alternatives, these 
two metaphors-the 'grasped thing' and the 'bundle of sticks' -have been 
traditionally used to conceive of private property. Property is power,141 and 
judicial reliance on these two conventional metaphors, especially in the 
area of family law, has tended to deny women valuable property rights and 
their accompanying social power, thereby contributing to women's 
subordination. 
(ii) Sports, War and Sex Metaphors 
Law is power. Law colors every aspect of life, fixes the limits of 
liberty and defines morality. 142 
[L]aw is essentially the choices we make for other people: the 
decision to obliterate someone else's community; the decision to 
deny to another person the ability to speak to her god in her chosen 
place and way; the decision to put some other human being in a 
cage; and on and on.143 
The next part of this section describes how law's language and metaphor 
may alienate women and prevent women from participating in law's 
powerful dialogue. 
Ostensibly, the American adversary system simply involves "active 
and unhindered parties contesting with each other to put forth a case before 
an independent decision-maker."I44 However the reality of the system is 
more complex and contains influential subtleties. Sports, war and sex 
metaphors permeate every comer of litigation language.145 White, 
educated, privileged men have written the story of law and crafted its 
language,l46 so it is not surprising that the nature of these metaphors, and 
141. See MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
46-47 (1967) ("We must not overlook the actual fact that dominion over things is also 
imperium over our fellow human beings."). 
142. See Finley, supra note 80, at 886 ("Law reaches every silent space. It invades the 
secrecy of women's wombs. It breaks every silence, uttering itself. Law-language 
jurisdiction. It defines. It commands. It forces.") (footnote omitted) Id., quoting Ashe, 
Zig-Zag Stiching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction and the Law", 13 
NOVAL.J. 355, 355 (1989). 
143. Ross, supra note 2, at 1084 (footnote omitted). 
144. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 20 (Pocket Ed. 1996). 
145. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text. 
146. See Finley, supra note 80, at 892; Thornburg, supra note 45, at 251 n.208. White 
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the way they have been traditionally utilized, have highlighted masculine 
"patterns of socialization, experience, and values.,,147 
Many in legal academia are concerned about the messages these 
metaphors convey-and rightly so. The legal war metaphor inherently 
portrays a brutal two-sided affair in which misbehavior is excused, is 
sometimes condoned, and may be instrumental in helping one reach the 
ultimate goal: defeating one's opponent. 148 Most sports metaphors used in 
the legal world involve two teams within the confines of a violent winllose 
dichotomy.149 The cooperative aspects of team sports are left out of legal 
discourse, the emphasis typically placed on "winning at all costs rather than 
fair play and rules.,,15o 
Professor Eileen Scallen is concerned for her students. She writes, in 
an article discussing the 0.1. Simpson trial, about the focus on the outcome 
of the litigation "game.,,151 She notes that games have winners and losers, 
and what gets lost in the anticipation of the outcome is the question: "Does 
it matter how you play the game?,,152 
Other scholars have debated the consequences of using sports metaphor 
in legal discourse. Chad Oldfather critiques the baseball metaphor's use, 
and notes that "feminist theorists have found in sporting rhetoric 'the very 
essence of patriarchal oppression. ",153 Michael Yelnosky responds to this 
males continue to craft and interpret law's language. See Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial 
Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282, 287-93 (1993) (noting that 85% of 
President Reagan's U.S. district court appointees and 92% of his U.S. appeals court 
appointees were white males). 
147. Thornburg, supra note 45, at 251, citing Finley, supra note 80, at 893. 
Men have shaped [legal language], they have defined it, they have 
interpreted it and given it meaning consistent with their understandings of 
the world and of people 'other' than them. As the men of law have defined 
law in their own image, law has excluded or marginalized the voices and 
meanings of these 'others.' 
Finley, supra note 80, at 892 (footnote omitted). 
148. See Thornburg, supra note 45. 
149. See id. at 243. In fact, "[t]he most popular metaphor is boxing, a sport in which 
hurting the opponent is part of the game." Id. A 1983 U.S. court of appeals decision 
provides one example of the boxing metaphor: 
Blonder-Tongue did not throw merely a jab at the multiplicity of patent 
litigation; rather, it intended a knockout blow through the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel so that any time a patent was found invalid in a fair fight 
with a knowledgeable referee, the courts could count to ten and the patent 
holder could no longer maintain that he was champion. 
Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 710 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
A quote taken from a San Francisco Bay Area periodical, although made in a political rather 
than legal context, typifies the hard-nosed nature of legal sports metaphor: "If you show up 
with a tennis racket, you're not going to play. You better show up with spikes." F.J. 
Gallagher, Playing Hardball, THE INDEPENDENT, April 21, 1998, at 1 (quoting Calvin 
Welch, an affordable-housing developer). 
150. Thornburg, supra note 45, at 243. 
151. Scallen, supra note 4. 
152. Id. at 289. 
153. Oldfather, supra note 59, at 36 n.78. Others question the broader oppressive nature 
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criticism by suggesting that some feminist scholars "have used sports as a 
metaphor not for the oppression of women but instead for the emancipation 
of women .... ,,154 Women are participating in sports in ever increasing 
numbers, Yelnosky suggests, and sports metaphors in general, and baseball 
metaphors in particular, can be useful for both sexes in understanding and 
working within the law. 155 Further, Yelnosky suggests that sports have 
meaningful "feminine" aspects which have been largely ignored. 156 
Professors Maureen Archer and Ronnie Cohen examine sports 
metaphor use in judicial opinions and conclude that those unfamiliar with 
sports or sports metaphors' idiomatic meanings-a group comprised of a 
disproportionately large number of women-are often excluded from law's 
dialogue. 157 Archer and Cohen quote one commentator's argument: "The 
trivia of sports, like the pseudo-complexity of academic language, makes 
the out-group, the oppressed group, feel awed and powerless. And that's 
just how men want women to feel about sports and about life.,,158 
However, Archer and Cohen agree with Yelnosky, that, despite the fact 
that "games and sport are [still] highly institutionalized aspects of our 
culture that help to maintain male hegemony,,,159 female participation in 
sports is on the increase and women are becoming more comfortable with 
the language of sportS.160 Therefore, while the language of sports continues 
to perpetuate male privilege in the legal world by way of its limited 
accessibility, its ability to do so in the future may decrease. 
Sex metaphors, although arguably more subtly used than sports and 
war metaphors, are often combined with these metaphors to reinforce the 
idea of a legal system dominated by heterosexual male sexuality.161 The 
combination of these metaphors "indicates strongly that the world of 
of the game metaphor. See, e.g., MUMIA ABU-JAMAL, LIVE FROM DEATH Row (1996) 
(expressing his outrage at the devastating and disproportionate effect of 'get tough on crime' 
laws and rhetoric on Mrican American men: "When I hear easy, catchy, mindless slogans 
like 'three strikes, you're out,' I think of [people] who had one strike (if not one foul) and 
are, for all intents and purposes, already outside of any game worth playing." [d. at 43). 
154. Yelnosky, supra note 60, at 841. 
155. See id. 
156. See id. 
157. See Maureen Archer & Ronnie Cohen, Sidelined on the (Judicial) Bench: Sports 
Metaphors in Judicial Opinions, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 225 (1998). 
158. [d. at 233 (footnote omitted). Law is riddled with obscure sports references. An 
example: "A multi-party, multi-claim, multi-court Donnybrook in which all have at one time 
or another lashed out against each other for all or any part they could get, this Tinker-to-
Evers-to-Chance ended when our suitors were put out by an infield fly." Kessler & 
Kennelly v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 531 F.2d 248, 249 
(1976) (footnotes omitted). Less obscure, but still not widely understood, terms such as 
"fielders choice" are also common. See Archer & Cohen, supra note 157. 
159. Archer & Cohen, supra note 157, at 233 (quoting M. Ann Hall, How Should We 
Theorize Gender in the Context of Sport, in SPORT, MEN AND THE GENDER ORDER 239 
(Michael A. Messner & Donald F. Sabo eds., 1990». 
160. See Archer & Cohen, supra note 157, at 233-34. 
161. See Thornburg, supra note 45, at 246. 
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litigation is populated solely by men.,,162 Women, as a result of this 
specific metaphorical structuring of litigation, are often non-entities in 
conceptions of the legal world, unless they adopt male traits. 163 
Furthermore, legal sexual metaphors "are not images of mutually 
pleasurable adult relationships; they are images of domination and 
. ,,164 
aggressIOn. 
In conclusion, legal metaphor is a valuable tool. It helps us frame 
issues, comprehend abstract concepts and shape our understanding of the 
larger legal world. Unfortunately, a metaphor is an imperfect tool and its 
uncritical use leaves important realities unilluminated. Uncritical reliance 
on some legal metaphors, in addition to other effects,165 has aided in 
disadvantaging women and excluding women from law's dialogue. 
II. METAPHOR MANIPULATION AND NEW MEANING 
Uncritical adherence to legal metaphor has harmful consequences. 
Fortunately, metaphor can also be a powerful progressive tool for reshaping 
realities; metaphor can enlighten and create positive change.166 
This next section will focus on a number of possible manipulations of 
metaphor which should facilitate new meaning and understanding, which in 
tum could lead to a more 'just' justice system. Different strategies include: 
1) extending the used part of traditional metaphors; 2) utilizing the unused 
parts of traditional metaphors; 3) introducing novel metaphors; 4) mixing 
metaphors; and 5) unpacking and destabilizing traditional metaphors. 
Understanding by way of metaphor involves using one's understanding 
of one thing to understand something else. Linguists often refer to the 
162. Id. at 245 ("In real life, of course, women are lawyers and judges and clients. But 
they are invisible in this metaphorical paradigm."). Furthermore, this system seems to allow 
no room even for men to break out of this stereotyped role. 
163. See id. at 246. 
164. !d. See also supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
165. See id. at 256-65. (The pre-trial process, alternative dispute resolution, the lawyer's 
duty to opponents and third persons and even the lawyer's integrity, are each harmed by the 
types of adversary metaphors which dominate litigation discourse.) A lawyer does not 
simply engage an enemy in a 'battle to death' for the good of her client. Litigation involves 
give-and-take and a good amount of cooperation between opposing sides. While all lawyers 
are not unfeeling, battling automatons, many live this litigation metaphor at work. See id. at 
265. The result could be that "the gladiator finds that he has lost touch with his own 
emotions, distrusts everyone ... compUlsively competes in all contexts, and even suffers 
from physical manifestations such as heart attacks and a lowered immune system." Id. at 
265 (discussing Adrienne Drell, Chilling Out, A.B.A. J. 70,70-73 (1994)). 
166. However, such change may require patience. 
[T]he transition of a language from an old quality to a new does not take 
place by way of an explosion, by the destruction of an existing language and 
the creation of a new one, but by the gradual accumulation of the elements 
of the new quality, and, hence, by the gradual dying away of the elements of 
the old quality. 
Josef Stalin, Revolution From Above, quoted in MARXISM: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 308 (David 
McLellan ed., 1988). 
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understood thing as the "source domain" and the thing to be understood as 
the "target domain.,,167 Typically, only certain parts of a source domain are 
used, or highlighted, to understand the target domain. 168 In other words, 
there are used parts and unused parts. For example, in the conventional 
metaphor "theories are buildings," general knowledge of buildings is used 
to help grasp "theory" as a concept. 169 However, only the foundation, outer 
walls and support structure of buildings are typically used to describe 
theories. Everyday linguistic expressions evince this: "Your theory has no 
foundation. I've only put together the framework of a theory. Your 
argument is shaky.,,170 Other parts of buildings such as staircases, hallways 
and rooms are not typically used to understand theories. These are the 
unused parts of the metaphor. 171 
Manipulation of conventional metaphor by way of extending its used 
parts should effect new meaning. With the "theories are buildings" 
metaphor above, Lakoff and Johnson offer the following examples for such 
extension: "These facts are the bricks and mortar of my theory," and "My 
theory is strengthened by concrete and steel; it is no weak argument."l72 
One is still working within the general metaphor and applying the parts 
traditionally used, but extending them to gain a richer understanding of the 
target domain. 
Turning to the legal world, judges are most often umpires in the 
baseball metaphor prevalent in legal discourse. 173 Inevitably, they enforce 
the rules of the 'game,' which includes calling balls and strikes.174 These 
are some of the used parts of the metaphor-umpires, the strike zone, balls 
and strikes-parts which may be extended as seen in the following 
language: 
When a fastball comes in over the plate, quite close to the knees, 
some persons might think it was a strike, others a ball, but 
whatever way the umpire calls it, there was probably substantial 
evidence to justify his judgment. . " In this case ... the hearing 
officer said he had to decide a factual question that 'is a close one.' 
When there is substantial evidence to support the ... conclusion, I 
167. LAKOFF & TuRNER, supra note 12, at 63. 
168. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 10-13. 
169. See id. at 46. 
170. [d. 
171. See id. at 52-53. 
172. [d. at 53. 
173. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; Stephen D. Easton, "Yer Outta Here!" A 
Framework for Analyzing the Potential Exclusion of Expert Testimony Under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 1 (1998); 39 authors, The Jurisprudence of Yogi 
Berra, 46 EMORY L.J. 697 (1997). 
174. "In addition to enlarging the 'strike zone' for admissible scientific evidence, Daubert 
also replaces the umpire calling the game." Estate of Bud Hill et al. v. Conagra Poultry 
Co., 1997 WL 538887, at *3 (N.D. GA. August 25,1997). 
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do not believe that simply because a case is close the Board must 
lose, even though others might have 'called it' differently.175 
Here, the idea of the judicial strike zone is expanded. The author 
suggests that, as opposed to every judge working with the same, constant 
strike zone, each judge has her own conception of the zone and that close 
calls may go either way. This highlights the subjective nature of some 
judicial decisionmaking and suggests that different judges may make 
different rulings on the same set of facts. 
The batter is another aspect commonly used in the legal baseball 
metaphor, and, typically, lawyers or litigants are batters, having to step up 
to the plate. 176 Extending this used part, one appellate judge writes, "We 
step back into the batter's box, having allowed one to go by us and tipping 
another, in the hopes that on our third and final swing we can avoid a 
judicial strike-out."I77 This example stretches the batter concept to include 
judges, who typically are seen as umpires,178 and suggests that a judge's 
role may entail more than passively deciding balls and strikes. Litigants, 
lawyers and judges, it follows, are in a position where they must rise to the 
task and perform for their colleagues and supporters. 
Another way to enrich and enliven understanding by manipulating a 
traditional metaphor is by exploring its unused parts.179 As mentioned 
above, the foundation, walls and support structure are the parts of a 
building traditionally used in the 'theories are buildings' metaphor. 180 
Examples of employing unused parts of the metaphor are seen in the 
following, offered by Lakoff and Johnson: "His theory has thousands of 
little rooms and long, winding corridors," and "He prefers massive Gothic 
theories covered with gargoyles.,,181 New perspective, flavor and 
appreciation of theories is gained by utilizing the traditionally unused parts 
of the metaphor. 
An example of using the unused part of a traditional legal metaphor is 
seen in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,182 a 1985 
Supreme Court decision. Justice O'Connor's dissent includes the 
following language: "The Court today surveys the battle scene of 
federalism and sounds a retreat. Like Justice Powell, I would prefer to hold 
the field and, at the very least, render a little aid to the wounded.,,183 Here, 
175. Medical Centor of Beaver County, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 716 F.2d 995, 1002 
(Higginbotham,1. dissenting). 
176. See, e.g., Adrabawi v. Carnes Co., 152 F.3d 688,697 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[defendant] 
steps up to the plate on this issue with two strikes already called."). 
177. Hoskins v. Wainwright, 485 F.2d 1186, 1187 (5th Cir. 1973). 
178. See supra note 173. 
179. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 52-53. 
180. See id. 
181. [d. at 53. 
182. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
183. /d. at 580. O'Connor's use of the war metaphor is also interesting because it supports 
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Justice O'Connor uses the war metaphor ubiquitous in legal discourse, but 
highlights an aspect of war that is conventionally pushed aside. She brings 
up the fact that war involves human victims who need medical aid. War 
requires some compassion and mercy. By highlighting aspects of war other 
than its brutality, competitiveness and hostile nature, the war metaphor may 
be used within the law as a tool for creating a more cooperative, more 
compassionate legal system. 
In addition to manipulating conventionalized metaphors, introduction 
of novel metaphors can create new meaning. 184 
New metaphors have the power to create a new reality. This can 
begin to happen when we start to comprehend our experience in 
terms of a metaphor, and it becomes a deeper reality when we 
begin to act in terms of it. If a new metaphor enters the conceptual 
system that we base our actions on, it will alter that conceptual 
system and the perceptions and actions that the system gives rise 
to. 185 
Novel metaphors allow one to rediscover things thought to be familiar; 
they hold the power to recreate realities. Lakoff and Johnson give an 
example of novel metaphor use in describing how an Iranian student 
arrived in Berkeley, and upon hearing the phrase "the solution of my 
problems," internalized it in a very different way than his American 
peers. 186 He thought of the metaphor as involving a chemical solution 
rather than the more commonly imagined puzzle-solving type of 
solution. 187 The student took the expression to describe "a large volume of 
liquid, bubbling and smoking, containing all of [one's] problems, either 
dissolved or in the form of precipitates, with catalysts constantly dissolving 
some problems [for the time being] and precipitating out others.,,188 This 
novel chemical metaphor suggests that problems are not solved, whereupon 
they disappear forever, but rather that they are temporarily dissolved and 
may reappear again if the conditions are right. 189 Instead of investing time 
and energy in trying to solve problems once and for all, as is possible under 
the "problems are puzzles" metaphor, one seeing problems using the 
chemical solution metaphor may direct their energy into "finding out what 
catalysts will dissolve [their] most pressing problems for the longest time 
without precipitating out worse ones."I90 
the proposition that the use of this violent, 'masculine' metaphor is so pervasive that it 
crosses gender lines. 
184. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 139-46. 
185. [d. at 145. 
186. /d. at 143. 
187. See M. 
188. [d. 
189. Seeid. at 143-44. 
190. [d. at 144. 
5.*49 ~'¥ 
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The sports, war and sex metaphors used in litigation language tend to 
emphasize violence and competition between two opponents-winning, 
losing and aggression are highlighted by these metaphors. 191 However, 
cooperation and compromise are essential to the practice of law. 
Introducing a novel metaphor may act as a catalyst, altering the perception 
of law to include this reality. Elizabeth Thornburg suggests a few suggests 
metaphors. 192 Law, according to Thornburg, may be understood through 
metaphors of fine arts, education, journey, food and conversation. 193 Used 
in lieu of the adversarial metaphors which permeate the legal world, these 
metaphors suggest a more cooperative, less hostile legal system. 
Margaret Radin offers a novel metaphor for certain kinds of private 
property: "property as personhood.,,194 Radin posits that a piece of 
personal property, if important enough to its owner, may become so 
enmeshed with the owner's conception of self that it actually forms a piece 
of the psychological self.195 Radin's metaphor offers a feminist legal 
perspective, attacking legal notions of "abstract idealism, transcendence, 
foundationalism, and atemporal universality .... ,,196 By seeing property as 
constitutive of personhood, one must give up the idea that a piece of 
property is the same piece of property for everyone in all circumstances. 
The metaphor favors a case-by-case analysis of the meaning of property to 
its owner and thus recognizes that a wedding ring, for example, does not 
have the same meaning for a ring dealer as it does for someone who has 
worn it for twenty years. 197 
Jeanne Schroeder suggests a property metaphor of her own: "property 
as liquid. ,,198 After laying out the inadequacies of the 'bundle of sticks' 
metaphor, she suggests the 'property as liquid' metaphor, one that is less 
brittle and less solid. l99 Schroeder argues that "property rights, like liquid, 
do not move in a single discrete piece, or as a series of disaggregated 
sticks. They flow.,,2°O 
Underlying conditions of the metaphor could foster a flexible 
conception of property. For example, liquid must be somehow contained 
lest it spread about. Flexibility may thus flow from the fact that "[l]iquid 
191. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. 
192. See Thornburg, supra note 45, at 269-76. 
193. See id. 
194. Radin, supra note 98. 
195. Id. 
196. Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 
1707 (1990). 
197. For a critique of Radin's theory, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret 
Radin's Imagery of Personal Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REv. 55 
(1994). 
198. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the u.e.e. Killed 
"Property," 69 TEMPLE L. REv. 1281, 1339-41 (1996). 
199. See id. at 1340. 
200. Id. 
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property can take on the form of whatever bottle it is poured into, and 
contemporary property can be reconfigured into new legal functions.,,201 
The courts in the Todd and Graham cases, discussed above, could have 
used a novel metaphor similar to Schroeder's to address the problem of 
how to conceive of human capital upon dissolution of a marriage.202 
Realizing human capital does not fit within traditional property law 
'boxes,' and acknowledging that a graduate degree obtained during a 
marriage is a valuable asset earned by both partners, the courts could have 
characterized property rights attaching to the graduate degrees as flexible 
and flowing. A 'fluid' conception of property may have allowed the 
Graham court to avoid the task of counting rigid property-rights sticks203 
and prevented the Todd court from focusing on 'graspability.'204 Such a 
characterization could have recognized the wives' contributions to, and 
investments in, the degrees and permitted the courts to resolve the 'diploma 
dilemmas' equitably. 
A fourth way to use metaphor to create new meaning is to combine 
metaphors. Although the admonishment "don't mix your metaphors" is 
often heard, creatively mixing metaphors can be very powerful. Lakoff and 
Turner suggest that mixing metaphors may "produce a richer and more 
complex set of metaphorical connections, which gives inferences beyond 
those that follow from each of the metaphors alone.,,205 Research 
investigating sports and war metaphors in political discourse includes 
discussion of mixed metaphors?06 One piece of research discusses a 
sentence spoken by a Marine officer: "Washington is trying to have it both 
ways. They're playing Monday morning general.,,207 Decisionmakers in 
Washington are seen as "a general" and "spectators of a football game. ,,208 
One immediately perceives that the Marine views these policy makers as 
having an incredible amount of power, "an amateurs' retrospective 
wisdom" about the "game" of war, and as occupying a position distant 
from the violence and consequences of war.209 Science also involves 
mixing metaphors. In the realm of cognitive science, researchers have 
posited that "metaphors of loops, programs, feedback and copies or traces 
are not mutually exclusive but can be mixed and rearranged to develop new 
theories and guide further research.,,210 
201. Id. 
202. See supra section IC(i). 
203. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text. 
204. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
205. LAKOFF & TuRNER, supra note 12, at 70. 
206. See N. Howe, Metaphor in Contemporary American Political Discourse, 3 
METAPHOR & SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY 87 (1988). 
207. Id. at 99. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Robert R. Hoffman et aI., Cognitive Metaphors in Experimental Psychology, in 
METAPHORS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 97 (David E. Leary ed., 1990). 
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Professors Archer and Cohen, in their discussion of sports metaphor 
use in judicial opinions, address mixing metaphors.211 They offer one court 
opinion mixing sports metaphors: "I know of no law directing that a 
plaintiff who misses with his first shot at proving damages should be given 
a second shot. If we have cases suggesting such, they may be safely said 
[to be] out in left field.,,212 Another opinion mixes sports and non-sports 
metaphors: "open the floodgates to potential 'cheap shots' against the 
interest of a defendant.,,213 
Following is an interesting mixed metaphor found in an appellate 
decision: "The battle of the forms in this case takes the form of something 
very like a badminton game .... ,,214 Twisting convention, the author uses 
a sports metaphor, which usually highlights the competitive nature of the 
legal world, to soften the conventional war metaphor. The battle of the 
forms is not really a battle at all in this case. There are no warring parties, 
no brutality in the trenches, no win-at-all-costs attitudes. By carefully 
mixing metaphors-metaphors which are often linked215 -this appellate 
judge conveys a sense of two litigating parties engaged in a relatively 
harmless and often enjoyable game that most people associate with lazy 
spring or summer days. 
Finally, metaphor may be manipulated through unpacking or 
destabilization.216 Eighteenth century philosopher Thomas Reid contended 
that people "are naturally disposed to conceive a greater similitude in 
things than there really is.,,217 And, as discussed above, many common 
comparisons and metaphors tend to be used unconsciously and 
uncritically.218 Our knowledge and understanding is thus limited because 
metaphorical structuring is necessarily partial; some parts of reality· are 
highlighted while other parts are ignored.219 Destabilizing, or unpacking, a 
metaphor includes asking 'what does it mean for this to be seen in terms of 
that?' 'What is made salient for me and at what expense?' It includes 
exploring the strengths and weaknesses of attributing the features of one 
thing to another. 
Lakoff and Turner suggest Othello is doing just this in act five of 
Shakespeare's Othello: 
211. See Archer & Cohen, supra note 157. 
212. Whittington v. Whittington, 535 So. 2d. 573, 588 n.l (Miss. 1988) (Robertson, J. 
concurring). 
213. Ohio v. Lumpkin, No. 90 CA 82, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5168, at *11 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Oct. 25, 1991). 
214. Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Industries, 29 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994). 
215. See Thornburg, supra note 45. 
216. I acquired these terms and this idea from Dr. James Temple, Professor of Psychology, 
Saint Mary's College of California. 
217. THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN 49 (MIT Press 1969) 
(1785), quoted in METAPHORS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 6. 
218. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
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Yet she must die, else she'll betray more men. 
Put out the light, and then put out the light: 
If I quench thee, thou flaming minister, 
I can then thy former light restore, 
Should I repent me; but once put out thy light, 
Thou cunning'st pattern of excelling nature, 
I know not where is that Promethean heat 
That can thy light relume.22o 
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Othello uses the common conceptual metaphor "life is a flame,,221 
when equating killing with "putting out the light.,,222 He then goes on to 
acknowledge a weakness in the metaphor's portrayal of reality when 
describing how "he can put out the candle as he can snuff out her life, but it 
is only the candle that he can relight. ,,223 
A controversy from the history of the philosophy of science provides 
another example. The 'mechanistic' world view, espoused by Leibnitz 
years ago and many cognitive scientists today, essentially sees the mind as 
a machine. Thomas Reid was critical of this world view-this mind as 
machine metaphor-and inverts the metaphor in order to destabilize it: 
Shall we believe with Leibnitz, that the mind was originally formed 
like a watch wound up; and that all its thoughts, purposes, passions 
and actions, are effected by the gradual evolution of the original 
spring of the machine, and succeed each other in order, as 
necessarily as the motions and pulsations of a watch? 
If a child of three or four years, were put to account for the 
phenomena of a watch, he would conceive that there is a little man 
within the watch, or some other little animal that beats continually, 
and produces the motion. Whether the hypothesis of this young 
philosopher in turning the watch spring into a man, or that of the 
German philosopher into turning a man into a watch spring, be the 
most rational, seems hard to determine. 224 
Reid exposes the mind as machine metaphor for what it is-a 
metaphor, a theory about thought processes. Reid makes the comparison 
involved explicit, and by criticizing it invites others to expand their 
conception of the human mind. 
220. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO 150 (penguin 1986), quoted in LAKOFF & TuRNER, 
supra note 12, at 31. 
221. LAKOFF & TuRNER, supra note 12, at 31. 
222. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO 150 (penguin 1986), quoted in LAKOFF & TuRNER, 
supra note 12, at 31. 
223. Id. 
224. REID, supra note 188, at 444, quoted in METAPHORS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 
37, supra note 6. 
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Professor Clay Calvert provides an example of metaphor unpacking by 
addressing the "information superhighway" metaphor ubiquitous in 
discussions surrounding laws affecting new telecommunications 
technologies and computer-mediated communication.225 Calvert tracks the 
metaphor's history and then examines what the metaphor emphasizes and 
what it downplays.226 "Commerce, speed, and point-to-point 
communication" are highlighted, suggests Calvert, while "culture, stability 
and non-point-to-point communication" are pushed aside.227 Calvert 
writes: 
There is no experience of travel as suggested by the 'information 
superhighway' metaphor. In fact, in a situation where there is 
complete time-space convergence, the point-to-point metaphors do 
not make much sense because in this new communication 
topography one does not travel from one point to another but, 
instead, virtually brings two points together. The points are no 
longer rooted in a particular geographic location but are fluid and 
mobile on the flow of information streams?28 
Throughout his article, Calvert picks apart the 'information 
superhighway' metaphor and forces the reader to critically examine its 
limits.229 Calvert urges legal and policy decisionmakers to do the same 
when addressing issues of novel telecommunications and computer 
technologies.23o 
Law review pages are fertile soil for metaphor destabilization-they 
contain numerous thought-provoking examples of conventional legal 
metaphor unpacking. Here, legal scholars peel off the successive layers of 
the "states as laboratories,,,231 "standing,,,232 and health law's "physician as 
fiduciary,,233 metaphors to name but a few. 
In sum, these different manipulations of metaphor can be effective 
tools. They allow us to view complex and even familiar concepts from 
different vantage points. In focusing on language and metaphor, there is 
225. See Clay Calvert, Regulating Cyberspace: Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and the 
Framing of Legal Actions, 20 HASTINGS COMMiENT L.J. 541 (1998). 
226. See id. 
227. Id. at 553. 
228. Id. at 556. (footnote omitted). Notice how Calvert inserts a novel metaphor at the end 
of his critique: "information streams." 
229. See id. 
230. See id. For a similar critique of electronic information and communication 
metaphors, see Pamela Samuelson, The Quest For Enabling Metaphors for Law and 
Lawyering in the Information Age, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2029 (1996). 
231. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The "States-as-Laboratories" Metaphor in State 
Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 475 (1996). 
232. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371 (1988). 
233. See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Strain in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician 
Loyalties Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241 (1995). 
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always the danger of "shrinking from law's noontime realities of prisons 
and money, pain and greed, into the more sheltered domain of texts, tropes 
and dialogue,,,234 but there is also the possibility of rearranging world-
views to allow in less harmful, more just conceptions of property, litigation 
and the legal world in general. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Metaphor shapes thought and action. Our very ability to understand 
the world around us may only be possible through use of metaphor. 
Likewise, it may be impossible to speak of the legal world without using 
metaphor; metaphor pervades legal discourse and creates legal reality. 
However, a metaphor only tells part of the story-some facets of reality are 
concealed by its use, and uncritical acceptance of a metaphor limits our 
understanding. Uncritical acceptance of legal metaphor can be dangerous. 
Communities may be destroyed, homes lost, innocents imprisoned, people 
put to death, families shattered and, as discussed in this Note, groups may 
be silenced and subordinated. However, we have the tools to prevent 
metaphor from injuring. We have the tools to make metaphor a catalyst for 
progressive change. Changes in law's language, and corresponding 
changes in thought and action, can be empowering. Therefore, we must not 
only narrowly watch our legal metaphors, as Cardozo suggests,235 but we 
must also creatively employ them in our continuing effort to gain a fuller 
vision of the law. 
234. Margaret Jane Radin, presentation at the 1989 annual meeting of the Association of 
American Law Schools (quoted in THOMAS C. GREY, DEATH IS THE MOTHER OF METAPHOR 
(1991)). 
235. Berkey v. 3d Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94 (1926) ("Metaphors in law are to be 
narrowly watched, for starting out as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving 
it."). 
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